### ENVIORMENT

#### The plan provides the necessary pipeline to move away from coal and oil, acting as a bridge towards renewables—this is the greatest internal link to warming

Easterbrook 2011 (Gregg; The Pipeline we actually need; Dec 10; <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/11/opinion/sunday/the-pipeline-we-actually-need.html?pagewanted=all>; kdf)

Today, natural gas is being found in tremendous quantities in the shale formations of the East Coast (owing in part to the controversial extraction method known as hydraulic fracturing), the Bakken shale field in North Dakota (where the gas is being “flared” or burned off as a waste product, because there are no pipelines to carry it to consumers), Prudhoe Bay and Cook Inlet in Alaska, the Mackenzie River Delta in Canada and elsewhere.¶ An opportunity exists to replace coal and oil, the most carbon-intense fossil fuels, with natural gas, which produces 30 percent less greenhouse gas per unit of energy generated than oil, and 50 percent less than coal.¶ Even without access to Alaska’s abundant natural gas, domestic production has risen steadily for a decade, last year hitting its highest level since 1973, according to the federal Energy Information Administration. “Proved reserves of natural gas have grown significantly over the past several years,” the agency said recently. It estimates, moreover, that the country has about a century’s worth of technically recoverable natural gas resources at current rates of consumption. (United States oil reserves equal about a three-year supply.) Production of natural gas has risen about 20 percent over the last four years despite a low prevailing price for this commodity — an ideal situation for consumers.¶ Policy makers might not have noticed the boom in natural gas reserves, but the market surely has. In October, Kinder Morgan, an energy giant that owns many of the terminals used for oil and coal transportation, bid $21 billion for El Paso Corporation’s natural gas pipelines. The deal would make Kinder Morgan the country’s largest operator of natural gas facilities.¶ Some urban buses already run on natural gas. Honda began selling a Civic that runs on natural gas; its energy use equates to 31 miles per gallon of gasoline at $2 a gallon, with low greenhouse-gas emissions. The financier T. Boone Pickens is backing a bid to install natural gas pumps at truck stops. Cheniere Energy, a Houston company, has agreed to export liquefied natural gas to Spain. As Washington wrings its hands about dependence on imported oil, American companies will ship a superior, cleaner fuel overseas.¶ Yet energy policy is still premised on the notion that coal and oil must be used for most needs, while carbon-neutral green energy from the sun, wind and biofuel is the main alternative. Here, the perfect becomes the enemy of the good. On paper, green energy can eliminate greenhouse emissions, while natural gas cannot: using gas instead of coal and oil would merely reduce carbon accumulation in the atmosphere. But most practical applications of all-green energy remain years off, if not decades.¶ That’s where the missing pipeline comes in. Prodigious amounts of natural gas are sitting in Alaska. It is conventional gas, which can be extracted without the problems associated with hydraulic fracturing for shale gas. (Some research suggests shale gas production via hydraulic fracturing causes methane emissions that offset the clean-burning advantage of gas.) If the natural gas in Alaska could be moved to the contiguous states, substantial long-term supply would be ensured. Buyers confidently could switch to natural-gas vehicles or gas heating; utilities confidently could switch from coal-fired generation, the dirtiest form of megawatts, to gas power.¶ Several Alaskan natural gas pipeline routes have been proposed. All require either cutting across British Columbia or converting natural gas into a liquid for shipment by tanker. All proposals entail complex capital-intensive efforts that would take years, require government support in the form of loan or price guarantees, and almost certainly cause political brawls — since everyone wants low-cost natural gas, but no one wants the pipelines or shipping terminals nearby.¶ Right now, with the price of natural gas low, private capital isn’t interested in building a major pipeline to Alaska. Such a pipeline could serve the national interests of the United States for decades. That makes support of an Alaska gas pipeline an appropriate role for the federal government. Yet the Obama administration is not interested — because only the word “green” is politically correct.

### Shocks

#### The current regulatory structure of natural gas undermines the economy by leaving the US uncompetitive and sending jobs overseas

Stolle 2007 (Russ R. [Senior Vice President, Deputy General Counsel @ Huntsman]; Written Statement before the Commodity Futures Trading Commision; Sept 18; kdf)

Global manufacturing companies like Huntsman depend on the commodities ¶ markets for critical raw materials and rely on fair pricing in those markets in order to be ¶ competitive, both domestically and abroad. A key commodity for Huntsman, as well as ¶ for thousands of other domestic businesses and millions of farmers and consumers, is ¶ natural gas. Unfortunately, price volatility in the market for natural gas in the United ¶ States has made the U.S. significantly less competitive relative to other countries for ¶ manufacturing operations that rely on natural gas as a commodity, which has, and if not ¶ addressed will continue to have, a significant impact on employment in the ¶ manufacturing sector of this country’s economy. Our company is one of many U.S. ¶ companies to have been competitively disadvantaged on the global playing field by this ¶ price volatility, and we believe our experience is representative of the experience of many ¶ others. ¶ Following the year 2000, our management began to conclude that ongoing ¶ volatility in the price of natural gas in the United States would likely be such that it ¶ would become necessary to both divest those of our businesses that are most dependent ¶ on the consumption of large quantities of natural gas (thus reducing our exposure to ¶ unpredictable and increasingly large swings in the cost of producing our products) and to ¶ shift new investments overseas to countries less subject to significant volatility in the ¶ price for natural gas. The global composition of our workforce followed suit. In the year ¶ 2000, approximately 37% of our company’s 10,400 employees were working in the ¶ United States. By the first quarter of this year, that percentage of our workforce that are ¶ U.S. employees had fallen to about 23%. By year-end 2007, only 18% of our company’s ¶ roughly 13,000 employees will be located here—a greater than 50% reduction of that ¶ percentage of our global workforce. While most of those reductions are the result of ¶ divestitures of certain of our U.S. businesses rather than plant closures, those divestitures ¶ were largely to an energy company that can integrate those assets with its own, and our ¶ reinvestment has largely been overseas—in the end, a net loss of jobs here in the U.S. Of ¶ the multiple new plants and expansions we have announced during this period, only one ¶ of major significance is located in the United States—an exothermic process that also ¶ produces a by-product gas stream that happens to rise in value with the price of natural ¶ gas, favorably impacting the plant’s economics. If you were to look at Huntsman’s use ¶ of its discretionary growth capital (meaning that used for new plants and capacity ¶ additions) during the last three years, and include that which we have budgeted for 2008, ¶ you would find that roughly 78% of the more than $1.1 billion combined was, or in the ¶ case of next year’s budget will be, used for projects located outside of the U.S. If we ¶ include expectations for 2009, that percentage is projected to climb to roughly 85% of a ¶ combined $1.6 billion for the years 2005 through 2009. ¶ Our company strongly believes that price volatility in the U.S. market for natural ¶ gas is due to a failure of the current regulatory structure for the trading of futures on ¶ natural gas to serve the fundamental purposes of the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”) ¶ and to ensure that the trading of futures facilitates rather than impairs transactions in the ¶ real economy in which manufacturing companies like Huntsman must operate.

#### US economic competitiveness prevents multiple scenarios for global nuclear conflicts

Friedberg & Schoenfeld 8 (Aaron Friedberg is a professor of politics and international relations at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School. Gabriel Schoenfeld, senior editor of Commentary, is a visiting scholar at the Witherspoon Institute in Princeton, N.J., “The Dangers of a Diminished America,” Wall Street Journal, Ocbtober 21, 2008,http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122455074012352571.html]

With the global financial system in serious trouble, is America's geostrategic dominance likely to diminish? If so, what would that mean? One immediate implication of the crisis that began on Wall Street and spread across the world is that the primary instruments of U.S. foreign policy will be crimped. The next president will face an entirely new and adverse fiscal position. Estimates of this year's federal budget deficit already show that it has jumped $237 billion from last year, to $407 billion. With families and businesses hurting, there will be calls for various and expensive domestic relief programs. In the face of this onrushing river of red ink, both Barack Obama and John McCain have been reluctant to lay out what portions of their programmatic wish list they might defer or delete. Only Joe Biden has suggested a possible reduction -- foreign aid. This would be one of the few popular cuts, but in budgetary terms it is a mere grain of sand. Still, Sen. Biden'scomment hints at where we may be headed: toward a major reduction in America's world role, and perhaps even a new era of financially-induced isolationism*.* Pressures to cut defense spending, and to dodge the cost of waging two wars, already intense before this crisis, are likely to mount. Despite the success of the surge, the war in Iraq remains deeply unpopular. Precipitous withdrawal -- attractive to a sizable swath of the electorate before the financial implosion -- might well become even more popular with annual war bills running in the hundreds of billions.Protectionist sentiments are sure to grow stronger as jobs disappear in the coming slowdown*.* Even before our current woes, calls to save jobs by restricting imports had begun to gather support among many Democrats and some Republicans. In a prolonged recession, gale-force winds of protectionism will blow. Then there are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial architecture. For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system*.* The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits*,* as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future? Meanwhil*e,* traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos. Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern. If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by *the remorseless* fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear toys*, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability.* The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors even harder than they will rock us*.* The dramatic free fall of the Russian stock market has demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices, now driven down by the global slowdown. China is perhaps even more fragile, its economic growth depending heavily on foreign investment and access to foreign markets. Both will now be constricted, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures. As for our democratic friends, the present crisis comes when many European nations are struggling to deal with decades of anemic growth, sclerotic governance and an impending demographic crisis. Despite its past dynamism, Japan faces similar challenges. India is still in the early stages of its emergence as a world economic and geopolitical power. What does this all mean?There is no substitute for America on the world stage. The choice we have before us is between the potentially disastrous effects of disengagement and the stiff price tag of continued American leadership*.* Are we up for the task? The American economy has historically demonstrated remarkable resilience. Our market-oriented ideology, entrepreneurial culture, flexible institutions and favorable demographic profile should serve us well in whatever trials lie ahead. The American people, too, have shown reserves of resolve when properly led. But experience after the Cold War era -- poorly articulated and executed policies, divisive domestic debates and rising anti-Americanism in at least some parts of the world -- appear to have left these reserves diminished. A recent survey by the Chicago Council on World Affairs found that 36% of respondents agreed that the U.S. should "stay out of world affairs," the highest number recorded since this question was first asked in 1947. The economic crisis could be the straw that breaks the camel's back.

#### Market innovation will outpace scarcity

Norberg 03Senior Fellow at Cato Institute

Johan, *In Defense of Global Capitalism*, 2003, p. 223)

It is a mistake, then, to believe that growth automatically ruins the environment. And claims that we would need this or that number of planets for the whole world to attain a Western standard of consumption—those “ecological footprint” calculations—are equally untruthful. Such a claim is usually made by environmentalists, and it is concerned, not so much with emissions and pollution, as with resources running out if everyone were to live as we do in the affluent world. Clearly, certain of the raw materials we use today, in present day quantities, would not suffice for the whole world if everyone consumed the same things. But that information is just about as interesting as if a prosperous Stone Age man were to say that, if everyone attained his level of consumption, there would not be enough stone, salt, and furs to go around. Raw material consumption is not static. With more and more people achieving a high level of prosperity, we start looking for ways of using other raw materials. Humanity is constantly improving technology so as to get at raw materials that were previously inaccessible, and we are attaining a level of prosperity that makes this possible. New innovations make it possible for old raw materials to be put to better use and for garbage to be turned into new raw materials. A century and a half ago, oil was just something black and sticky that people preferred not to step in and definitely did not want to find beneath their land. But our interest in finding better energy sources led to methods being devised for using oil, and today it is one of our prime resources. Sand has never been all that exciting or precious, but today it is a vital raw material in the most powerful technology of our age, the computer. In the form of silicon—which makes up a quarter of the earth's crust— it is a key component in computer chips. There is a simple market mechanism that averts shortages. If a certain raw material comes to be in short supply, its price goes up. This makes everyone more interested in economizing on that resource, in finding more of it, in reusing it, and in trying to find substitutes for it.

Growth leads to interdependence which greatly reduces the risk of war – five reasons

Yee 99 (Tan Tan, Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces, Jan-Mar, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/back/journals/1999/Vol25\_1/7.htm)JFS

Like the Democratic Peace Proposition, the notion that increased interdependence reduces the probability of war among nations is not new. For one, economists have long demonstrated that economic interdependence benefits both parties through the process of international trade. The underlying rationale is worth explaining. In a simple model of a two-state-two-product international economy, even if a particular state is more efficient at producing both goods, it would still make more economic sense for each state to specialise in producing one of the goods and thereafter obtain the other through barter exchange. This is because the issue is one of relative rather than absolute efficiency; the more efficient state should optimise its limited resources to focus entirely on producing the goods where it has a relatively greater efficiency. From an economic viewpoint, therefore, international trade represents one of the rare occasions in international affairs that present a win-win situation to both parties.15 Traditionally, theories on the effect of interdependence between states on the risk of war can be divided into two main camps. On the one extreme, liberals argue that economic interdependence lowers the likelihood of war by increasing the value of trading over the alternative of aggression; in other words, states would rather trade than fight.16 To put it simply, trade is mutually beneficial, while war is at best a zero-sum game. At the same time, the increasing lethality of modern weapons has greatly increased the costs and risks of war, thus making the trading option seem even more rational. Four other subsidiary propositions supporting the liberal view are worth mentioning here.17 Firstly, the increased economic activity that accompanies higher trade levels tends to promote domestic prosperity, and in doing so lessens the internal problems that push leaders to war. Secondly, trade may alter the domestic structure of a particular state, giving more influence to groups with a vested interest in the continuation of peaceful trade. Thirdly, a higher level of interdependence inevitably leads to increased interaction between governments and peoples. This enhances understanding and an appreciation of each other's views and perspectives, reducing the misunderstandings and miscalculations that sometimes lead to war. The final argument asserts that trade has the spillover effect of enhancing political ties between trading partners, thus improving the prospects for long-term co-operation. Going by the liberal arguments, there is cause for optimism as long as a high level of interdependence can be maintained among all states. Rosecrance sums up the view rather neatly that high interdependence fosters peace by making trading more profitable than invading.18 Some liberals explain the continuing occurrence of war as a result of the misconception of political leaders caught up in the outmoded belief that war still pays.19 Yet others saw it as the misguided attempts by political leaders to gamble for an outright victory in war, in which case the benefits would be even greater. The contention is that inspite of the pacifist tendencies that interdependence brings about, it may sometimes not be enough to prevent war from happening.

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Statistical models prove growth solves for the environment

Tierney 9 (John, science columnist for the New York Times, journalism degree from Yale U, cites Nobel Prize winning economist Simon Kuznets, Ph.D from Columbia U, Apr 20, [tierneylab.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/04/20/the-richer-is-greener-curve/] AD: 6-21-11, jm)

In my Findings column, I explain how researchers have discovered that, over the long term, being richer often translates into being greener. Many environmental problems get worse as a country first industrializes, but once it reaches a certain level of income, the trend often reverses, producing a curve shaped like an upside-down U. It’s called a Kuznets curve (in honor of the economist Simon Kuznets, who detected this pattern in trends of income inequality). As promised in the column, here are some graphic examples of Kuznets curves for sulphur dioxide pollution, as measured in an assortment of rich and poor countries, and also as measured over time in the United States. Each line is an environmental Kuznets curve for a group of countries during the 1980s. The levels of sulphur dioxide pollution (the vertical axis) rise as countries becomes more affluent (the horizontal axis). But then, once countries reach an economic turning point (a gross domestic product close to $8,000 per capita), the trend reverses and air pollution declines as countries get richer. In this analysis by Xiang Dong Qin of Clemson University, the green line shows countries with strong protections for property rights; the red curve shows countries with weaker protections. I’m not trying to argue that all environmental problems fit these curves, or that these improvements happen automatically. How fast the environment improves depends not just on money but on whether a country has an effective government, educated citizens, healthy institutions and the right laws. (For discussions of the variability of these curves and the factors that affect them, see this PERC report by a group led by Bruce Yandle of Clemson University and this article in Environment, Development and Sustainability by Kuheli Dutt of Northeastern University.) But rising incomes can make it more likely that improvements will come, and these Kuznets curves give more reason for optimism than the old idea that economic growth endangered the planet. In the 1970s, rich countries were urged to “de-develop” by Paul Ehrlich and John P. Holdren, now the White House science adviser. I welcome your thoughts on what can be learned from Kuznets curves — and whether people at opposite ends of the curves can find common ground. As America got richer in the the 20th century, emissions of sulphur dioxide rose. But thanks to new technologies, new laws and new desires for cleaner air, the trend reversed, and sulphur-dioxide pollution declined even though population and wealth kept rising.

Growth reverses environmental damage – EKC models prove

Yandle et al 2 (Bruce, prof of econ @ Clemson U, Maya Vijayaraghavan, Ph.D in applied econ from Clemson U, Madhusudan Bhattarai, postdoctoral economist with the International Water Management Institute in Colombo, Sri Lanka, Feb 1, [www.perc.org/articles/article688.php] AD: 6-21-11, jm)

Since 1991, when economists first reported a systematic relationship between income changes and environmental quality, this relationship, known as the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC), has become standard fare in technical conversations about environmental policy (Grossman and Krueger 1991). When first unveiled, EKCs revealed a surprising outcome: Some important indicators of environmental quality such as the levels of sulfur dioxide and particulates in the air actually improved as incomes and levels of consumption went up. Prior to the advent of EKCs, many well-informed people believed that richer economies damaged and even destroyed their natural resource endowments at a faster pace than poorer ones. They thought that environmental quality could only be achieved by escaping the clutches of industrialization and the desire for higher incomes. The EKC's paradoxical relationship cast doubt on this assumption. We now know far more about the linkages between an economy and its environment than we did before 1991. This primer shares this knowledge. There is no single EKC relationship that fits all pollutants for all places and times. There are families of relationships, and in many cases the inverted-U Environmental Kuznets Curve is the best way to approximate the link between environmental change and income growth. The indicators for which the EKC relationship seems most plausible are local air pollutants such as oxides of nitrogen, sulfur dioxide, and particulate matter. The EKC evidence for water pollution is mixed, but there may be an inverted U-shaped curve for biological oxygen demand (BOD), chemical oxygen demand (COD), nitrates, and some heavy metals (arsenic and cadmium). In most cases, the income threshold for improving water quality is much lower than the air pollution improvement threshold. The acceptance of the EKC hypothesis for select pollutants has important policy implications. It implies that some environmental degradation along a country's development path is inevitable, especially during the take-off process of industrialization. Second, it suggests that when a certain level of per capita income is reached, economic growth helps to undo the damage done in earlier years. If economic growth is good for the environment, policies that stimulate growth (trade liberalization, economic restructuring, and price reform) should be good for the environment.

Growth solves pollution and incentivizes green living

Taylor 3 (Jerry, director of natural resource studies at the Cato Institute, adjunct scholar at the Institute for Energy Research, Apr 23, [www.connectusfund.org/resources/happy-earth-day-thank-capitalism] AD: 6-21-11, jm)

Indeed, we wouldn't even have environmentalists in our midst were it not for capitalism. Environmental amenities, after all, are luxury goods. America -- like much of the Third World today -- had no environmental movement to speak of until living standards rose sufficiently so that we could turn our attention from simply providing for food, shelter, and a reasonable education to higher "quality of life" issues. The richer you are, the more likely you are to be an environmentalist. And people wouldn't be rich without capitalism. Wealth not only breeds environmentalists, it begets environmental quality. There are dozens of studies showing that, as per capita income initially rises from subsistence levels, air and water pollution increases correspondingly. But once per capita income hits between $3,500 and $15,000 (dependent upon the pollutant), the ambient concentration of pollutants begins to decline just as rapidly as it had previously increased. This relationship is found for virtually every significant pollutant in every single region of the planet. It is an iron law. Given that wealthier societies use more resources than poorer societies, such findings are indeed counterintuitive. But the data don't lie. How do we explain this? The obvious answer -- that wealthier societies are willing to trade-off the economic costs of government regulation for environmental improvements and that poorer societies are not -- is only partially correct. In the United States, pollution declines generally predated the passage of laws mandating pollution controls. In fact, for most pollutants, declines were greater before the federal government passed its panoply of environmental regulations than after the EPA came upon the scene. Much of this had to do with individual demands for environmental quality. People who could afford cleaner-burning furnaces, for instance, bought them. People who wanted recreational services spent their money accordingly, creating profit opportunities for the provision of untrammeled nature. Property values rose in cleaner areas and declined in more polluted areas, shifting capital from Brown to Green investments. Market agents will supply whatever it is that people are willing to spend money on. And when people are willing to spend money on environmental quality, the market will provide it. Meanwhile, capitalism rewards efficiency and punishes waste. Profit-hungry companies found ingenious ways to reduce the natural resource inputs necessary to produce all kinds of goods, which in turn reduced environmental demands on the land and the amount of waste that flowed through smokestacks and water pipes. As we learned to do more and more with a given unit of resources, the waste involved (which manifests itself in the form of pollution) shrank. This trend was magnified by the shift away from manufacturing to service industries, which characterizes wealthy, growing economies. The latter are far less pollution-intensive than the former. But the former are necessary prerequisites for the latter. Property rights -- a necessary prerequisite for free market economies -- also provide strong incentives to invest in resource health. Without them, no one cares about future returns because no one can be sure they'll be around to reap the gains. Property rights are also important means by which private desires for resource conservation and preservation can be realized. When the government, on the other hand, holds a monopoly on such decisions, minority preferences in developing societies are overruled (see the old Soviet block for details). Furthermore, only wealthy societies can afford the investments necessary to secure basic environmental improvements, such as sewage treatment and electrification. Unsanitary water and the indoor air pollution (caused primarily by burning organic fuels in the home for heating and cooking needs) are directly responsible for about 10 million deaths a year in the Third World, making poverty the number one environmental killer on the planet today. Capitalism can save more lives threatened by environmental pollution than all the environmental organizations combined. Finally, the technological advances that are part and parcel of growing economies create more natural resources than they consume. That's because what is or is not a "natural resource" is dependent upon our ability to harness the resource in question for human benefit. Resources are therefore a function of human knowledge. Because the stock of human knowledge increases faster in free economies than it does in socialist economies, it should be no surprise that most natural resources in the western world are more abundant today than ever before no matter which measure one uses.

#### Right-wing groups will squash their movement and bring global fascism.

Lewis 94 associate research professor of geography, co-director of Comparative Area Studies, Duke University, Martin W., *Green Delusions*, 1994, pp. 170-171

The extreme left, for all its intellectual strength, notably lacks the kind of power necessary to emerge victorious from a real revolution. A few old street radicals may still retain their militant ethos, but today’s college professors and their graduate students, the core marxist contingent, would be ineffective. The radical right, on the other hand, would present a very real threat. Populist right-wing paramilitary groups are well armed and well trained, while establishment-minded fascists probably have links with the American military, wherein lies the greatest concentration of destructive power this planet knows. Should a crisis strike so savagely as to splinter the American center and its political institutions, we could well experience a revolutionary movement similar to that of Germany in the 1930s. Marxists, however, would likely counter this argument by citing the several cases of successful socialist revolutions. Successful though they were, none makes a compelling analogue. First, no Marxist revolution has ever come close to occurring in an advanced capitalist nation. Triumphant leftist revolutions have only taken place in economically backward countries, and generally only after an unrelated war had demoralized the old guard. More importantly, as Hamerow (1990) clearly shows, all successful Marxian revolutions have relied on the strategic cooperation of the bourgeoisie against the aristocracy; only after the old regime is toppled are the fractionated moderates cut out of power. Considering the fate that has generally befallen them under such circumstances, it is unlikely that the business classes—even in the world’s more feudal countries—would again be tempted by the promises of a mixed economy offered to them by would-be leftist revolutionaries. Except perhaps in El Salvador and Peru, contemporary Marxist revolutionary movements are irritants to the ruling elites rather than real threats. In contemplating the likely future of a revolutionary United States, we encounter the ultimate paradox of contemporary Marxism: the unintended collusion of the radical left and the radical right. Even during periods of normality, the opposing ends of the political spectrum feed strongly on each other—in sardonic fashion, they are each other’s best allies. The Marxian left is extraordinarily frightening to the vast majority of the populace, and the stronger it becomes, the more seductive the propaganda of the radical right grows. The equation can also be reversed; leftist rhetoric draws its real power in opposition to the radical right, not the accommodating center. With every KKK outrage, with every atrocity committed by the Los Angeles Police Department, the marxian message grows ever more convincing to horrified progressives. The broad center of responsible conservatives, moderates, and liberals may attempt to remain dispassionate and to refute both extremes, but in a deteriorating political environment, marked by inflamed passions, such a stance will seem to many increasingly inadequate. If, in the event of extraordinary crisis, the center does fold, I must conclude that most Americans would follow the far right rather than the far left. American society has simply been too prosperous, and the majority of its citizens too accustomed to owning property, to be willing to risk everything on a communist experiment. Alexander Cockburn of The Nation has repeatedly pleaded with liberals not be afraid to endorse socialism—a fine position indeed if one would like to see reactionaries gain uncontested power throughout the United States. If truly concerned about social justice and environmental protection, I would counter liberals should not be afraid first to embrace, and then seek to reform, capitalism.

#### Authors exaggerate for individual interests--Growth is empirically sustainable

The Australian, 09 Staff Writer

“Reports of death of capitalism are greatly exaggerated,” 6-25-09 http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,25685608-20261,00.html)

Fareed Zakaria, in Newsweek, suggests capitalism may not need rescuing**:** MANY experts are convinced that the situation cannot improve yet because their own sweeping solutions to the problem have not been implemented. Most of us want to see more punishment inflicted, particularly on America's bankers ... But fundamentally, markets are not about morality. They are large, complex systems, and if things get stable enough, they move on. Consider our track record over the past 20 years, starting with the stockmarket crash of 1987, when on October19 the Dow Jones lost 23 per cent, the largest one-day loss in its history ... John Kenneth Galbraith wrote that he just hoped that the coming recession wouldn't prove as painful as the Great Depression. It turned out to be a blip on the way to an even bigger, longer boom. Then there was the 1997 East Asian crisis, during the depths of which Paul Krugman wrote in a Fortune cover essay, "Never in the course of economic events - not even in the early years of the Depression - has so large a part of the world economy experienced so devastating a fall from grace." He went on to argue that if Asian countries did not adopt his radical strategy - currency controls - we could be looking at the kind of slump that 60 years ago devastated societies, destabilised governments and eventually led to war. Only one Asian country instituted currency controls, and partial ones at that. All rebounded within two years.

#### We’re on the verge of a global consciousness shift towards biospheric empathy-makes growth environmentally sustainable and solves every impact-collapse now destroys the transition

Jeremy Rifkin, President of the Foundation on Economic Trends, 1-11-2010, “'The Empathic Civilization': Rethinking Human Nature in the Biosphere Era,” Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jeremy-rifkin/the-empathic-civilization\_b\_416589.html

Recent discoveries in brain science and child development, however, are forcing us to rethink these long-held shibboleths about human nature. Biologists and cognitive neuroscientists are discovering mirror-neurons--the so-called empathy neurons--that allow human beings and other species to feel and experience another's situation as if it were one's own. We are, it appears, the most social of animals and seek intimate participation and companionship with our fellows. Social scientists, in turn, are beginning to reexamine human history from an empathic lens and, in the process, discovering previously hidden strands of the human narrative which suggests that human evolution is measured not only by the expansion of power over nature, but also by the intensification and extension of empathy to more diverse others across broader temporal and spatial domains. The growing scientific evidence that we are a fundamentally empathic species has profound and far-reaching consequences for society, and may well determine our fate as a species. What is required now is nothing less than a leap to global empathic consciousness and in less than a generation if we are to resurrect the global economy and revitalize the biosphere. The question becomes this: what is the mechanism that allows empathic sensitivity to mature and consciousness to expand through history? The pivotal turning points in human consciousness occur when new energy regimes converge with new communications revolutions, creating new economic eras. The new communications revolutions become the command and control mechanisms for structuring, organizing and managing more complex civilizations that the new energy regimes make possible. For example, in the early modern age, print communication became the means to organize and manage the technologies, organizations, and infrastructure of the coal, steam, and rail revolution. It would have been impossible to administer the first industrial revolution using script and codex. Communication revolutions not only manage new, more complex energy regimes, but also change human consciousness in the process. Forager/hunter societies relied on oral communications and their consciousness was mythologically constructed. The great hydraulic agricultural civilizations were, for the most part, organized around script communication and steeped in theological consciousness. The first industrial revolution of the 19th century was managed by print communication and ushered in ideological consciousness. Electronic communication became the command and control mechanism for arranging the second industrial revolution in the 20th century and spawned psychological consciousness. Each more sophisticated communication revolution brings together more diverse people in increasingly more expansive and varied social networks. Oral communication has only limited temporal and spatial reach while script, print and electronic communications each extend the range and depth of human social interaction. By extending the central nervous system of each individual and the society as a whole, communication revolutions provide an evermore inclusive playing field for empathy to mature and consciousness to expand. For example, during the period of the great hydraulic agricultural civilizations characterized by script and theological consciousness, empathic sensitivity broadened from tribal blood ties to associational ties based on common religious affiliation. Jews came to empathize with Jews, Christians with Christians, Muslims with Muslims, etc. In the first industrial revolution characterized by print and ideological consciousness, empathic sensibility extended to national borders, with Americans empathizing with Americans, Germans with Germans, Japanese with Japanese and so on. In the second industrial revolution, characterized by electronic communication and psychological consciousness, individuals began to identify with like-minded others. Today, we are on the cusp of another historic convergence of energy and communication--a third industrial revolution--that could extend empathic sensibility to the biosphere itself and all of life on Earth. The distributed Internet revolution is coming together with distributed renewable energies, making possible a sustainable, post-carbon economy that is both globally connected and locally managed. In the 21st century, hundreds of millions--and eventually billions--of human beings will transform their buildings into power plants to harvest renewable energies on site, store those energies in the form of hydrogen and share electricity, peer-to-peer, across local, regional, national and continental inter-grids that act much like the Internet. The open source sharing of energy, like open source sharing of information, will give rise to collaborative energy spaces--not unlike the collaborative social spaces that currently exist on the Internet. When every family and business comes to take responsibility for its own small swath of the biosphere by harnessing renewable energy and sharing it with millions of others on smart power grids that stretch across continents, we become intimately interconnected at the most basic level of earthly existence by jointly stewarding the energy that bathes the planet and sustains all of life. The new distributed communication revolution not only organizes distributed renewable energies, but also changes human consciousness. The information communication technologies (ICT) revolution is quickly extending the central nervous system of billions of human beings and connecting the human race across time and space, allowing empathy to flourish on a global scale, for the first time in history. Whether in fact we will begin to empathize as a species will depend on how we use the new distributed communication medium. While distributed communications technologies-and, soon, distributed renewable energies - are connecting the human race, what is so shocking is that no one has offered much of a reason as to why we ought to be connected. We talk breathlessly about access and inclusion in a global communications network but speak little of exactly why we want to communicate with one another on such a planetary scale. What's sorely missing is an overarching reason that billions of human beings should be increasingly connected. Toward what end? The only feeble explanations thus far offered are to share information, be entertained, advance commercial exchange and speed the globalization of the economy. All the above, while relevant, nonetheless seem insufficient to justify why nearly seven billion human beings should be connected and mutually embedded in a globalized society. The idea of even billion individual connections, absent any overall unifying purpose, seems a colossal waste of human energy. More important, making global connections without any real transcendent purpose risks a narrowing rather than an expanding of human consciousness. But what if our distributed global communication networks were put to the task of helping us re-participate in deep communion with the common biosphere that sustains all of our lives? The biosphere is the narrow band that extends some forty miles from the ocean floor to outer space where living creatures and the Earth's geochemical processes interact to sustain each other. We are learning that the biosphere functions like an indivisible organism. It is the continuous symbiotic relationships between every living creature and between living creatures and the geochemical processes that ensure the survival of the planetary organism and the individual species that live within its biospheric envelope. If every human life, the species as a whole, and all other life-forms are entwined with one another and with the geochemistry of the planet in a rich and complex choreography that sustains life itself, then we are all dependent on and responsible for the health of the whole organism. Carrying out that responsibility means living out our individual lives in our neighborhoods and communities in ways that promote the general well-being of the larger biosphere within which we dwell. The Third Industrial Revolution offers just such an opportunity. If we can harness our empathic sensibility to establish a new global ethic that recognizes and acts to harmonize the many relationships that make up the life-sustaining forces of the planet, we will have moved beyond the detached, self-interested and utilitarian philosophical assumptions that accompanied national markets and nation state governance and into a new era of biosphere consciousness. We leave the old world of geopolitics behind and enter into a new world of biosphere politics, with new forms of governance emerging to accompany our new biosphere awareness. The Third Industrial Revolution and the new era of distributed capitalism allow us to sculpt a new approach to globalization, this time emphasizing continentalization from the bottom up. Because renewable energies are more or less equally distributed around the world, every region is potentially amply endowed with the power it needs to be relatively self-sufficient and sustainable in its lifestyle, while at the same time interconnected via smart grids to other regions across countries and continents.

### AT Externalization K

#### 1) Framework- Interpretation: the affirmative defends plan action and the negative defends either the status quo or a competing policy option.

#### This is best for debate because it ensures predictable debates, and ensures the 2ac has ground. This is a voting issue for education and fairness

#### 2) Permutation the plan and the alternative

#### 3) Permutation do the plan and the alternative in every other instance

#### 4) **We must develop theories and tools together- eco-pragmatism solves best**

Farber 99 (Daniel [the Sho Sato Professor of Law and chair of the Energy and Resources Group at the University of California, Berkeley]; EcoPragmatism; p 9-10; kdf)

In this book, I argue for a pragmatic approach to environmental¶ problems, in which economic analysis is useful, but not controlling.¶ Critics of cost-benefit analysis are right that economic¶ efficiency is an inadequate basis for environmental policy. Indeed,¶ the "state of the art" of cost-benefit analysis would limit¶ its ability to generate firm answers to environmental questions¶ even if we did want to make it our sole basis for decision malting.¶ But the critics are wrong to build a wall between economics and¶ ethics. In practice) the cost-benefit analyst needs to make numerous¶ technical decisions that turn out to also involve ethical¶ issues. Moreover, many economic insights turn out to be relevant¶ to a broader policy analysis. Properly understood, then, the¶ dichotomy between economics and value judgments turns out to¶ be a false one.¶ The approach that I take in this book is part of a broader¶ movement in legal scholarship, which is sometimes called practical¶ reasoning or legal pragmatism. 22 Legal pragmatists are, in part, reacting against the increased obsession of some other legal¶ scholars with grand theories such as economic reductionism. A¶ convincing analysis should be like a web, drawing on the coherence¶ of many sources, rather than a tower, built in a single unified¶ foundation. Intelligent analysis requires the use of theories,¶ but as tools, not as ends in themselves. Environmental decisions¶ involve a complex network of scientific, economic, and normative¶ judgments. It is unlikely that we can construct a structure in¶ which all of these considerations will point to a single conclusion.¶ We can have better hopes of building an interlocking web¶ of arguments that will support a decision based on diverse, overlapping¶ considerations.¶ Being pragmatic does not mean the rejection of rules or principles¶ in favor of ad hoc decision making or raw intuition.¶ Rather, it means a rejection of the view that rules, in and of¶ themselves, dictate outcomes. Thus, we shouldn't expect some¶ mechanical technique to give cut-and-dried answers to hard policy¶ questions. Hard policy decisions can't be programmed into a¶ spreadsheet. To the extent that cost-benefit analysts purport to¶ provide such techniques, they are doomed by their inability to¶ capture the richness of actual policy decisions.

#### 5) We have an ethical reason do the plan—flaring releases toxins that settle in the lungs of animals and humans, causing them a life of pain and early death. Acid rain and warming destroy farm land and will cause billions to starve to death. These impacts are inevitable in a world without pipeline infrastructure—proves the alternative doesn’t solve the aff—Warming further exasperates stresses

**Pascual and Elkind 2010** (Carlos [US Ambassador to Mexico, Served as VP of foreign policy @ Brookings]; Jonathan [principal dep ass sec for policy and int energy @ DOE]; Energy Security; p 5; kdf)

**Climate change is arguably the greatest challenge facing the human race.**¶ **It poses profound risks to the natural systems** that sustain life on Earth and¶ consequently creates great challenges **for** human lives**, national economies,**¶ **nations' security, and international governance.** **New scientific reports**¶ emerging from one year to the next **detail ever more alarming potential**¶ **impacts and risks**.¶ It is increasingly common for analysts and policymakers to refer to¶ **climate change as a threat multiplier, a destructive force that will exacerbate**¶ **existing social, environmental, economic, and humanitarian stresses**.¶ The warming climate is predicted to bring about prolonged droughts¶ in already dry regions, flooding along coasts and even inland rivers, an¶ overall increase in severe weather events, rising seas, and the spread of¶ disease, to cite just a few examples. **Such impacts may spark conflict in**¶ **weak states, lead to the displacement of millions of people, create environmental**¶ **refugees, and intensify competition over increasingly scarce**¶ **resources.**¶ One of the great challenges of climate change is, indeed, the scope of¶ the phenomenon. The ongoing warming of the globe results chiefly from¶ one of the most ubiquitous of human practices, the conversion of fossil fuels¶ into energy through simple combustion. Halting and reversing climate¶ change, however, will require both unproven-perhaps even unimaginedtechnology¶ and sustained political commitment. We must change living¶ habits in all corners of the globe over the course of the next several decades.¶ We must resist the impulse to leave the problem for those who follow us¶ or to relax our efforts if we achieve a few years of promising progress. **The**¶ **profound challenge will lie in the need for successive rounds of sustained**¶ **policymaking, successive waves of technological innovation, and ongoing**¶ **evolution of the ways in which we live our lives.**

#### 6) **Violence is at an all-time low due to western thought, modernity, and capitalism. Our claims are grounded in empiricism, their k is lodged in lofty intellectual thought.**

Pinker 2011(Steven [Professor of Psychology @ Harvard; two time Pulitzer finalist]; The Better angels of our nature: why violence has declined; pp.xxi-xxiii; kdf)

This book is about what may be the most important thing that has ever happened in human history. Believe it or not-and I know that most people do not-violence has declined over long stretches of time, and today we may be living in the most peaceable era in our species' existence. The decline, to be sure, has not been smooth; it has not brought violence down to zero; and it is not guaranteed to continue. But it is an unmistakable development, visible on scales from millennia to years, from the waging of wars to the spanking of children. No aspect of life is untouched by the retreat from violence. Daily existence is very different if you always have to worry about being abducted, raped, or killed, and it's hard to develop sophisticated arts, learning, or commerce if the institutions that support them are looted and burned as quickly as they are built. The historical trajectory of violence affects not only how life is lived but how it is understood. What could be more fundamental to our sense of meaning and purpose than a conception of whether the strivings of the human race over long stretches of time have left us better or worse off? How, in particular, are we to make sense of 'modernity-of the erosion of family, tribe, tradition, and religion by the forces of individualism, cosmopolitanism, reason, and science? So much depends on how we understand the legacy of this transition: whether we see our world as a nightmare of crime, terrorism, genocide, and war, or as a period that, by the standards of history, is blessed by unprecedented levels of peaceful coexistence. The question of whether the arithmetic sign of trends in violence is positive or negative also bears on our conception of human nature. Though theories of human nature rooted in biology are often associated with fatalism about violence, and the theory that the mind is a blank slate is associated with progress, in my view it is the other way around. How are we to understand the natural state of life when our species first emerged and the processes of history began? The belief that violence has increased suggests that the world we made has contaminated us, perhaps irretrievably. The belief that it has decreased suggests that we started off nasty and that the artifices of civilization have moved us in a noble direction, one in which we can hope to continue. This is a big book, but it has to be. First I have to convince you that violence really has gone down over the course of history, knowing that the very idea invites skepticism, incredulity, and sometimes anger. Our cognitive faculties predispose us to believe that we live in violent times, especially when they are stoked by media that follow the watchword "If it bleeds, it leads." The human mind tends to estimate the probability of an event from the ease with which it can recall examples, and scenes of carnage are more likely to be beamed into our homes and burned into our memories than footage of people dying of old age.' No matter how small the percentage of violent deaths may be, in absolute numbers there will always be enough of them to fill the evening news, so people's impressions of violence will be disconnected from the actual proportions. Also distorting our sense of danger is our moral psychology. No one has ever recruited activists to a cause by announcing that things are getting better, and bearers of good news are often advised to keep their mouths shut lest they lull people into complacency. Also, a large swath of our intellectual culture is loath to admit that there could be anything good about civilization, modernity, and Western society. But perhaps the main cause of the illusion of ever-present violence springs from one of the forces that drove violence down in the first place. The decline of violent behavior has been paralleled by a decline in attitudes that tolerate or glorify violence, and often the attitudes are in the lead. By the standards of the mass atrocities of human history, the lethal injection of a murderer in Texas, or an occasional hate crime in which a member of an ethnic minority is intimidated by hooligans, is pretty mild stuff. But from a contemporary vantage point, we see them as signs of how low our behavior can sink, not of how high our standards have risen. In the teeth of these preconceptions, I will have to persuade you with numbers, which I will glean from datasets and depict in graphs. In each case I'll explain where the numbers came from and do my best to interpret the ways they fall into place. The problem I have set out to understand is the reduction in violence at many scales-in the family, in the neighborhood, between tribes and other armed factions, and among major nations and states. If the history of violence at each level of granularity had an idiosyncratic trajectory, each would belong in a separate book. But to my repeated astonishment, the global trends in almost all of them, viewed from the vantage point of the present, point downward. That calls for documenting the various trends between a single pair of covers, and seeking commonalities in when, how, and why they have occurred. Too many kinds of violence, I hope to convince you, have moved in the same direction for it all to be a coincidence, and that calls for an explanation. It is natural to recount the history of violence as a moral saga-a heroic struggle of justice against evil-but that is not my starting point. My approach is scientific in the broad sense of seeking explanations for why things happen. We may discover that a particular advance in peacefulness was brought about by moral entrepreneurs and their movements. But we may also discover that the explanation is more prosaic, like a change in technology, governance, commerce, or knowledge. Nor can we understand the decline of violence as an unstoppable force for progress that is carrying us toward an omega point of perfect peace. It is a collection of statistical trends in the behavior of groups of humans in various epochs, and as such it calls for an explanation in terms of psychology and history: how human minds deal with changing circumstances. A large part of the book will explore the psychology of violence and nonviolence. The theory of mind that I will invoke is the synthesis of cognitive science, affective and cognitive neuroscience, social and evolutionary psychology, and other sciences of human nature that I explored in Haw the Mind Works, The Blank Slate, and The Stuff of Thought. According to this understanding, the mind is a complex system of cognitive and emotional faculties implemented in the brain which owe their basic design to the processes of evolution. Some of these faculties incline us toward various kinds of violence. Others-" the better angels of our nature," in Abraham Lincoln's words-incline us toward cooperation and peace. The way to explain the decline of violence is to identify the changes in our cultural and material milieu that have given our peaceable motives the upper hand. Finally, I need to show how our history has engaged our psychology. Everything in human affairs is connected to everything else, and that is especially true of violence. Across time and space, the more peaceable societies also tend to be richer, healthier, better educated, better governed, more respectful of their women, and more likely to engage in trade. It's not easy to tell which of these happy traits got the virtuous circle started and which went along for the ride, and it's tempting to resign oneself to unsatisfying circularities, such as that violence declined because the culture got less violent. Social scientists distinguish "endogenous" variables-those that are inside the system, where they may be affected by the very phenomenon they are trying to explain-from the "exogenous" ones-those that are set in motion by forces from the outside. Exogenous forces can originate in the practical realm, such as changes in technology, demographics, and the mechanisms of commerce and governance. But they can also originate in the intellectual realm, as new ideas are conceived and disseminated and take on a life of their own. The most satisfying explanation of a historical change is one that identifies an exogenous trigger. To the best that the data allow it, I will try to identify exogenous forces that have engaged our mental faculties in different ways at different times and that thereby can be said to have caused the declines in violence.

#### 7) The alternative is vague and a voting issue for education and fairness because we are not able to predict how the alternative solves and cannot generate ground in the 2ac.

#### The immediacy of environmental degradation makes state action essential --- anti-statist critiques fail and reproduce violence

Eckersley ‘04

(Robyn, Department of Political Science, University of Melbourne, THE GREEN STATE: RETHINKING DEMOCRACY AND SOVEREIGNTY, p. 90-93)

It might be tempting to conclude from this general critique that states are part of the problem rather than the solution to ecological degradation. With its roots in the peace and antinuclear movements, the green movement has long been critical of the coercive modality of state power—including the state-military-industrial complex—and might therefore be understandably skeptical toward the very possibility of reforming or transforming states into more democratic and ecologically responsive structures of government. The notion that the state might come to represent an ecological savior and trustee appears both fanciful and dangerous rather than empowering. Yet such an anti-statist posture **cannot withstand critical scrutiny** from a critical ecological perspective. The problem seems to be that while states have been associated with violence, insecurity, bureaucratic domination, injustice, and ecological degradation, there is **no reason to assume that any alternatives** we might imagine or develop will necessarily be free of, or less burdened by, such problems. As Hedley Bull warns, violence, insecurity, injustice, and ecological degradation pre-date the state system, and we cannot rule out the possibility that they are **likely to survive the demise of the state system, regardless of what new political structures may aris**e. ‘9 Now it could be plausibly argued that these problems might be lessened under a more democratic and possibly decentralized global political architecture (as bioregionalists and other green decentralists have argued). However, there is no basis upon which to assume that they will be lessened any more than under a more deeply democratized state system. Given the **seriousness and urgency** of many ecological problems (e.g., global warming), building on the state governance structures that already exist seems to be a **more fruitful path** to take than any attempt to move beyond or around states in the quest for environmental sustainability.20 Moreover, as a matter of principle, it can be argued that environmental benefits are public goods that ought best be managed by democratically organized public power and not by private power.2l Such an approach is consistent with critical theory’s concern to work creatively with current historical practices and associated understandings rather than fashion utopias that have no purchase on such practices aid understandings. In short, there is more mileage to be gained by enlisting and creatively developing the existing norms, rules, and practices of state governance in ways that make state power more democratically and ecologically accountable than designing a new architecture of global governance de novo (a daunting and despairing proposition). Skeptics should take heart from the fact that the organized coercive power of democratic states is not a totally untamed power, insofar as such power must be exercised according to the rule of law and principles of democratic oversight. This is not to deny that state power can sometimes be seriously abused (e.g., by the police or national intelligence agencies). Rather, it is merely to argue that such powers are not unlimited and beyond democratic control and redress. The focus of critical ecological attention should therefore be on how effective this control and redress has been, and how it might be strengthened. The same argument may be extended to the bureaucratic arm of the state. In liberal democratic states, with the gradual enlargement, specialization, and depersonalization of state administrative power have also come legal norms and procedures that limit such power according to the principle of democratic accountability. As Gianfranco Poggi has observed, at the same time as the political power of the state has become more extensive in terms of its subject matter and reach, so too have claims for public participation in the exercise of this power widened.22 This is also to acknowledge the considerable scope for further, more deep-seated democratic oversight. Indeed, it is possible to point to a raft of new ecological discursive designs that have already emerged as partial antidotes to the technocratic dimensions of the administrative state, such as community right-to-know legislation, community environmental monitoring and reporting, third-party litigation rights, environmental and technology impact assessment, statutory policy advisory committees, citizens’ juries, consensus conferences, and public environmental inquiries. Each of these initiatives may be understood as attempts to confront both public and private power with its consequences, to widen the range of voices and perspectives in state administration, to expose or prevent problem displacement, and/or to ensure that the sites of economic, social, and political power that create and/or are responsible for ecological risks are made answerable to all those who may suffer the consequences. This is precisely where an ongoing green critical focus on the state can remain productive. Insofar as any agency of the state (military, police, or environmental protection agencies) is no longer properly accountable to citizens (whether directly and/or via the executive or the parliament), then the democratic state is failing its citizens. Seen in this light, the green critique of the administrative state should be understood **not as a critique of the state** per se but rather a critique of **illegitimate power**. It is a power that is no longer properly accountable to citizens according to the ideals of liberal democracy. The ultimate challenge for critical political ecologists should not be simply to bring liberal democratic practice into alignment with liberal democratic ideals (although this would be a good start) but to outline a distinctively green set of regulative ideals, and a green democratic constitutional state that is less exclusionary and more public spirited than the liberal democratic state. The concern should not be the mere fact that states exercise power but rather how this power can be made more accountable and hence more legitimate.

#### Debating about the state does not mean capitulating to it --- discussing government policy creates critical understanding that facilitates resistance against its worst abuses

**Donovan and Larkin ‘06**

 (Clair and Phil, Australian National University, *Politics*, Vol. 26, No. 1)

We do not suggest that political science should merely fall into line with the government instrumentalism that we have identified, becoming a 'slave social science' (see Donovan, 2005). But, we maintain that political scientists should be able to engage with practical politics on their own terms and should be able to provide research output that is of value to practitioners. It is because of its focus on understanding, explanation, conceptualisation and classification that political science has the potential to contribute more to practical politics, and more successfully. As Brian Barry notes, 'Granting (for the sake of argument) that [students of politics] have some methods that enable us to improve on the deliverances of untutored common sense or political journalism, what good do they do? The answer to that question is: not much. But if we change the question and ask what good they could do, I believe that it is possible to justify a more positive answer' (Bany, 2004, p. 22). A clear understanding of how institutions and individuals interact or how different institutions interact with each other can provide **clear and useful insights** that practitioners can successfully use, making - or perhaps remaking - a political science that 'directs research efforts to good questions and enables incremental improvements to be made' (ibid., 19). In this sense, political science already has the raw material to make this contribution, but it chooses not to utilise it in this way: no doubt, in part, because academics are motivated to present their findings to other academics and not the practitioners within the institutions they study.

#### Change outside the state is temporary --- only engaging institutions produces lasting remedies

**Milbrath ‘96**

(Lester W., Professor Emeritus of Political Science and Sociology – SUNY Buffalo, Building Sustainable Societies, Ed. Pirages, p. 289)

In some respects personal change cannot be separated from societal change. Societal transformation will not be successful without change at the personal level; such change is a necessary but not sufficient step on the route to sustainability. People hoping to live sustainably must adopt new beliefs, new values, new lifestyles, and new worldview. But **lasting** personal change is unlikely without simultaneous transformation of the socioeconomic/political system in which people function. Persons may solemnly resolve to change, but that resolve is **likely to weaken** as they perform day-today within a system reinforcing different beliefs and values. Change agents typically are met with denial and great resistance. Reluctance to challenge mainstream society is the major reason most efforts emphasizing education to bring about change are ineffective. If societal transformation must be speedy, and most of us believe it must, pleading with individuals to change is **not** **likely to be** **effective**.